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Alternative Theories of Illegal Trade : 
Economic Consequences and Statistical Detection 
By 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
Contents: I. Different Types of Illegal Trade. - II. Some Key Concepts. - III. Alternate Models: A. Illegal Trade through Legal Entry Points; 
B. Illegal Trade through Illegal Entry Points. - IV. Concluding Remarks. 
the theoretical analysis of illegal trade has received fresh 
impetus from the imaginative work of Mark Pitt [198.1]. The earlier 
analysis (initiated by the Bhagwati and Hansen [1973] paper and 
extended in subsequent contributions by Johnson [1974], Sheikh [1974] 
and others) had assumed that legally and illegally traded goods, as long 
as they were homogeneous, would be cleared in the domestic market at 
identical prices, and that this identical price would have to be equal to 
the tariff-inclusive price on legal trade since any domestic price below 
that would make legal trade unprofitable. 
Observing that legal trade in Indonesia co-exists with illegal trade and 
that despite this the domestic price is below the tariff-inclusive price (so 
that legal trade is presumably unprofitable), Pitt constructs a model that 
permits such "price disparity" to exist in the model. Basically, he argues 
that some legal trade is required if the trader is to handle illegal trade 
without unnecessary risk of detection; hence the loss on legal trade is to 
be seen as a way of permitting the profits on illegal trade to be earned. 
Pitt's ingenious work opens up therefore the question as to how illegal 
trade is optimally analyzed, and how it may then be best detected in 
empirical analysis. In the following analysis, I take the view that reality 
is complex and that there are different ways in which illegal trade will 
Remark: Thanks are due to the Guggenheim Foundation and the National Science 
Foundation for research support. In synthesizing and extending the theoretical work on 
modelling illegal trade, I have drawn on much earlier research where I collaborated with Bent 
Hansen and T. N. Srinivasan. To these distinguished economists, as also to Mark Pitt [198 1] 
whose paper provided the immediate impetus to write the present paper, I wish to express 
my thanks. I have also profited from conversations with Richard Brecher and Padma Desai 
and from the stimulating reactions of participants in seminars arranged by the Ford Foun- 
dation at the University of Philippines, the Bank of Indonesia and Thammasat University 
in Thailand. The comments of Mark Pitt have been most helpful, especially in correcting an 
•mportant error. 
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arise; that therefore there are different ways in which they need to be 
modelled and their positive and normative consequences analyzed; and 
there are correspondingly different ways in which they might be empiri- 
cally detected. I therefore take successive models of illegal trade below and 
consider them from the viewpoint of both their economic consequences 
and attendant implications for their detection. 
I. Different Types of Illegal Trade 
There are two basic types of illegal trade that need to be distinguished 
in the following, all triggered by either quantitative restrictions, which 
may be set in pure quantity or (as is more frequently the case) in value 
terms, or by tariffs, (i) The illegal trade may simply consist in bringing the 
goods through legal checkpoints but bypassing the control of the customs 
by simply bribing the customs officer or by concealing the importation in 
one form or another, (ii) On the other hand, the illegal trade may be 
conducted through illegal checkpoints, as in the popular conception of 
dhows pulling in from Bahrain et al. onto inadequately patrolled coast- 
lines and offloading their illegal cargos. 
The distinction between illegal trade through legal and illegal places 
of entry is of importance insofar as it has a bearing on the kinds of illegal 
trade that can arise in the two cases. Thus, if illegal trade takes place 
through illegal entry points, such trade is surely likely to be that associ- 
ated with "ships in the night" type of operation, which will in turn imply 
that definite real costs will be incurred in undertaking it. On the other 
hand, the illegal trade that arises in the shape of faked invoicing, where 
trade values are faked in order to reduce assessed payments or to increase 
assessed subsidies, evidently requires that such illegal trade occur through 
legal checkpoints where customs officers will confront he faked invoices 
in determining the tax payments or subsidy benefits on the alleged trade. 
Such faked invoicing is unlikely to involve the kinds of real costs that are 
associated with smuggling through illegal entry points and will therefore 
have differential implications, in consequence. In the analysis that follows 
in this paper, therefore, I will initially begin with those types of illegal 
trade that are typically associated with legal entry points, and then turn 
to the illegal trade that comes in through illegal entry points. 
II. Some Key Concepts 
In addition, the analysis below will focus on certain key concepts of 
"price disparities/1 distinguishing several types of relevant price discrep- 
ancies other than that noted by Mark Pitt, as also other disparities. 
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These will be of importance in yielding statistical methods of detecting 
the alternative types of illegal trade in the real world. I will also confine 
the analysis to import tariffs throughout. 
Thus, define the following symbols (assuming in each case that they 
relate to a specific imported good) : 
pf the f.o.b. price of the commodity, as recorded in partner-country's 
export data, plus estimated insurance and freight where excluded; 
pc the landed price of the commodity, as declared in valuation to 
customs when traders through legal entry points; 
p£ the landed price of the commodity, as it 
" truly 
" is as distinct from 
its declared value which may be faked, excluding the cost of misin- 
voicing, a, below; 
pd domestic price of the commodity (assuming no further distinction 
between wholesale, retail, internal transportation charges between 
different locations etc.) ; 
q{ the foreign, recorded export quantity of the commodity; 
qc the recorded import quantity of the commodity; 
t the legal tariff rate; 
te the "effective" (i.e. actual) tariff rate; 
α the unit cost charged by exporter to fake importer's invoice and 
make underinvoiced importation possible; 
β the unit bribe paid to customs officers to overlook misinvoicing. 
The distinction between legal and illegal trade, when relevant, is to be 
denoted by an added suffix, I for legal and i for illegal trade. With this 
notation, the following concepts may now be denned: 
(Ί) Landed Value versus Domestic Price (LVDP) Price Disparity 
This price disparity implies that pc (1 + 1) Φ pd, i.e. that the domestic 
price of the commodity is different from - in fact, is below - the tariff- 
inclusive, landed, declared value of the commodity, implying losses on the 
imports of the commodity. 
(2) "True" Landed Value versus Domestic Price (TLVDP) Price Disparity 
Where the declared and the "true" values differ, the LVDP measure 
must be distinguished from the TLVDP measure such that p* (1 + 1) Φ pd. 
This is presumably Pitt's price disparity. 
(3) Partner-Country-Comparison (PCC) Price Disparity 
In this case, there is a discrepancy between the declared unit value 
(price) of a commodity in the records of the exporting and importing 
28* 
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countries, when these are duly adjusted for differences in freight and 
insurance. This implies that pf Φ pc . 
(4) PCC Quantity Disparity 
Again, there may be disparity in recorded quantities in partner- 
country trade data, i.e. qf Φ qc . 
(5) PCC Value Disparity 
Similarly, there may be total value disparity in partner-country data, 
i.e. pf qf Φ pcqc, reflecting pf Φ pc and/or qf # qc . 
(6) Legal versus Illegal Trade (LI) Price Disparities 
Finally, one may have discrepancies between the prices in legal and 
illegal trade, implying for instance that either pdt Φ pdi, i.e. the domestic 
price of a commodity is different depending on whether it is legally or 
illegally imported; or p*| Φ ρ^, i.e., the true cost of importation in legal 
and illegal trade is different. 
III. Alternate Models 
In the following analysis, I consider altogether 6 different models, of 
which 4 are based on the assumption that illegal trade is conducted through 
legal entry points whereas the remaining 2 are formulated on the premise 
that it is conducted through illegal points of entry1. The analysis, it should 
be reemphasized, is confined to tariffs and to imports : but it can be readily 
extended, mutatis mutandis, to quantity restrictions and to exports. More- 
over, none of the models considered here allows for the illegally imported, 
homogeneous goods to be transacted in the domestic market at prices 
different from legally imported goods, thus imposing on them identical 
prices at identical locations regardless of how they are imported. This 
assumption may not make sense in reality as transacting in illegally-im- 
ported goods may impose a discount on them. Moreover, when it comes 
to durables, the extended service and maintenance components of the 
goods may simply not be available on illegally-imported goods; also the 
assurance of quality may not be identical when a consumer buys around 
the dark corner as when he buys from a well-heeled shopkeeper handling 
legally-imported goods. While this possible element of reality is assumed 
away in the six models considered below, many other complexities are 
1 These models represent polar types and reality reflects, at times, combinations thereof. 
Thus, faked invoicing may involve both unit- value and quantity faking; and it may involve 
both bribing of customs and sharing gains from faking with the exporter, whereas the four 
possibilities are modelled below as exclusive of one another. 
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allowed for and the models offer important abstractions of the kinds of 
illegal-trade phenomena to be encountered in practice. 
A. Illegal Trade through Legal Entry Points 
Where illegal trade occurs through legal entry points, i.e., where it is 
actually declared and passed through customs, the manner in which it 
occurs must involve some form of faked invoicing. A few observations are 
in order before the analysis is undertaken. 
Note first hat faked invoicing may be undertaken without he bribe- 
induced cooperation of customs officers. Alternatively, it may be under- 
taken with such cooperation. The implications of the two methods of 
faking invoices to secure illegal importation are different since the former 
is likely to involve a (direct) real cost to the country insofar as the faking 
will require the collaboration of the exporter at greater risk and hence 
compensation whereas the latter requires a bribe which is, in economic 
terms, only a transfer payment between nationals of the importing 
country1. 
Moreover, an implication of both basic model types here is that they 
blur the meaningfulness of the popular distinction between legally and 
illegally imported goods. For, in either case, the goods come in through 
legal channels but with illegal assessments of charges. 
Furthermore, the analysis below builds on the distinction between 
faking that concerns quantity declarations and that which works through 
false price (or unit value) declarations: the implications are again different. 
Finally, it should be noted that the analysis deployed here assumes 
throughout that an import tariff creates an economic incentive to under- 
invoice so as to avoid the full tariff. However, as was noted in the articles 
by Bhagwati [1964; 1967] which initiated the analysis of faked invoicing 
by using partner-country trade data comparisons, this does not always 
follow. For example, in countries with exchange control regimes and black 
market premia on foreign exchange, the faking incentive will be to over- 
invoice imports when the tariff rate is below the black market premium 
on foreign exchange; and it will be to underin voice, as assumed through- out here, when the tariff rate exceeds the black market premium (as would automatically be the case under full convertibility). 
1 It is conceivable, of course, that the illegal trade is transacted by foreign nationals, as noted by Bhagwati and Hansen [1973] in. their early analysis of smuggling. In that event, 
the argument in the text would need to be suitably modified. 
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Model I: Faked Invoicing of Unit Values or Prices, without Bribing of 
Customs 
In this case, the faking of the invoice, so as to underinvoice imports, 
occurs through understatement of the unit value at which the quantities 
(which are correctly invoiced) are imported. 
Such underinvoicing may occur costlessly to the importer, and hence 
to the country (assuming that the importer is a national), in the sense 
that the exporter is prepared to give the importer the faked invoice at 
negligible cost. Alternatively, it may occur at a non-negligible real cost, 
as when the importer has to share some fraction of his resulting gains 
with the exporter to induce him to supply the necessary faked invoice. 
The latter may be a possibility if the trade in the commodity is by repu- 
table firms and is subject to a non-negligible prospect of detection: in 
which case the risk of potential damage to the exporter from detection 
is non-negligible and hence may require inducement in the form of a 
share in the gains from underinvoicing. The welfare implications as also 
some of the "positive" implications will be different in each of the two 
cases. 
Case (j): Consider first the case where the real cost to the importer of 
faking the invoice is negligible. What are then the consequences for the 
different "disparities" distinguished above? Now, the effective tariff rate 
will be: te = tpc/p* since pd = p* + tpc. Therefore, the following conse- 
quences can be noted. 
(i) With pc < p* due to underinvoicing of imports, pd > pc (1 + 1) and 
therefore LVD Ρ price disparity, which relates to the declared unit value, 
will exist. However, it will exist with a reversed sign from Pitt's: impor- 
tation will appear as if it was yielding "abnormal" profits. 
(ii) Next, TLVDP price disparity will also exist, with Pitt's sign, with 
PÍ (1 + t) > pd (as pc < p* and pd = p* + tpc). 
(iii) At the same time, PCC price disparity will arise since the recorded, 
true export price (or unit value) will exceed the declared, understated im- 
port price, i.e., pf > pc. 
(iv) PCC quantity disparity will not arise, of course: qf = qc. 
(v) But PCC value disparity will, since pf qf > pc qc. 
(vi) Finally, there are no LI price disparities: legal and illegal trade 
are not meaningfully distinguishable in the fully competitive case, since 
all trade will be costlessly underinvoiced. 
The implications for statistical detections of this kind of illegal trade 
are evident. Price disparities of the LVDP, TLVDP and PCC variety have 
to be looked for. The TLVDP price disparity would require extracting the 
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"true" landed value. This and the PCC price and value disparities may be 
spotted through a careful use of the partner-country trade comparison 
technique which has been developed in Bhagwati [1964] who analyzed the 
faked invoicing of Turkish imports and in many other papers1. 
The welfare implications of such illegal trade are easily seen if a con- 
ventional social-utility-function approach is taken. In the Bhagwati- 
Hansen [1973] 2x2 model, the effect as illustrated in Figure 1 (adapted 
from Bhagwati and Hansen) is seen readily as that of a simple reduction 
Figure 1 
Good 2 A S' 
^^ ^■'income- con sumption 
>£j yr curve for pi 
'' O 
' Ó 
0 Β Goodi 
in the "effective" tariff level. Thus, in the legal case without faked in- 
voicing, the tariff-inclusive domestic goods price-ratio is p£ and consump- 
tion, production and welfare are at Q , Pz and Uz , respectively. With re- 
duction in effective tariff, the goods price-ratio shifts to p£ and consump- 
tion, production and welfare to Q, ΡΑ and Ui, respectively. Ui ^ Uj 
necessarily obtains since, ruling out inferior goods and associated multiple 
equilibria, a lower tariff will not be inferior to a higher tariff. 
1 Essentially, the analyst has to be able to correct for the many statistical reasons for 
discrepancies in PCC trade data, to be able to sift through to the faking that is sought to be 
pinned down. For a fuller discussion, see Bhagwati [1964; 1967] and Bhagwati etal. [1974]· 
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Of course, this conclusion is strictly limited to conventional welfare 
analysis. If import substitution, for instance, were valued as a "non- 
economic" objective or if revenues were important, the analysis would 
have to be suitably amended - as already done by several theorists of 
illegal trade for Model V below. Again, the sheer fact of illegality may 
constitute a negative element in the evaluation of the overall welfare im- 
pact. This factor is ignored in this paper but can be suitably allowed for in 
a fuller analysis. Equally, non-economic and revenue objectives can be 
allowed for: these are ignored here so as to focus rather on the major 
distinctions among the different models of illegal trade1. 
Case 2' Consider now the other case where the faked invoicing requires 
non-negligible real cost via sharing a fraction of the importer's gains from 
faking with the foreign exporter. This will modify critically the disparity 
and welfare outcomes. Note now that, with α representing the unit cost 
charged by the exporter to fake invoices for the importer, we have pd = 
Pc + tPc + α· Therefore, the effective tariff is te = (tpc + a)/pc. The 
following consequences then arise for disparities. 
(i) With pc < p* due to underinvoicing of imports, we again have 
Pd > Pc (1 + t)· Therefore, LVD Ρ price disparity again exists, with the 
reversed sign from Pitt's. 
(ii) At the same time, Τ LVD Ρ price disparity will also arise, with 
Pitt's sign, since {p* (1 + t) - pd} = t (pc - p£) + α < 0 as α > 0 but 
cannot exceed in absolute magnitude the total gain from underinvoicing 
measured by t (p* - pc). 
(iii) PCC price disparity will exist whether pf , the recorded export 
value adjusted for insurance and freight, includes the share in the gain 
from faking or not. In the former case, the disparity will be smaller. 
(iv) PCC quantity disparity does not exist, of course. 
(v) PCC value disparity will exist, reflecting the price disparity. 
(vi) LI price disparity cannot arise. 
The major difference in disparities when the faking of unit values 
occurs with real cost therefore is that the real cost now implies that the 
reduction in the domestic goods price-ratio, pd , that follows is no longer 
an unmixed gain. For, it is accompanied by a terms-of-trade loss as a 
result of the "true" landed price rising by the amount of the gain from 
faking that is shared with the foreign exporter. Therefore, as Bhagwati 
1 The contrasting implications of different models for issues such as the rank-ordering 
of the maximal revenue tariff with and without illegal trade are treated, for Models V and VI 
below, in Pitt [1981] for instance. 
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and Hansen [1973] demonstrated, the net welfare impact may be a gain or 
a loss. The reader can readily illustrate this by modifying Figure 1 to 
compare a (legal) higher-tariff situation with a (faked, illegal) lower-tariff 
situation, but with the latter now characterized by inferior terms of trade. 
Model II: Faked Invoicing of Quantity, without Bribing of Customs 
In this case, the faked invoicing occurs via misstatement of the quan- 
tity being imported. Typically, the containers may contain a larger quan- 
tity than invoiced. This rather common form of illegality may be safely 
assumed to require non-negligible real resource cost since quantity faking 
is more detectable than unit value faking and therefore more risky to the 
exporter's goodwill and future business, requiring therefore some compen- 
sation. It is also likely to involve special packing, which may be more ex- 
pensive. In this case, the following consequences arise. 
(i) LVD Ρ price disparity will exist because the effective tariff will 
have been lowered and therefore pc (1 + 1) > pd , with t > te . 
(ii) Similarly, TLVDP price disparity will also exist, with pc (1 + t) 
> pd since ρ* = Pc · 
(iii) If the recorded export data include the exporter's share in the 
gain from faking, pf > pc and the PCC price disparity will exist. 
(iv) At the same time, since quantities are being faked, PCC quantity 
disparity must evidently exist: qf > qc . 
(v) This will imply that PCC value disparity will exist: pf qf > pcqc. 
(vi) LI price disparities will not arise under competitive import trade 
(unless differences are introduced in the ability of different importers/ 
economic agents to manage illegal faking). 
The significant difference between unit-value and quantity faking, i.e. 
between Models I (2) and II, is then clearly that the latter generates the 
LVD Ρ price disparity with the Pitt inequality sign whereas the former 
does with the sign reversed, thus providing the analyst with a method of 
discriminating between these two types of faking that may sometimes 
work. So also the PCC comparisons, properly conducted, may be able to 
distinguish between cases where the value discrepancies arise from unit 
price as distinct from quantity differences. 
The nature of the welfare consequences, of course, is identical between 
the two models: since the (direct) real cost of faking is positive, both 
models leave open the possibility of a loss from the faking, even though 
the domestic price of the importable is reduced. 
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Model III: Faked Invoicing of Unit Values, with Bribes 
Consider now the case where Model I is modified so as to permit bribing 
of customs officers. This will change the picture insofar as the faking of 
invoices poses much-diminished risk of detection at the border now. Thus, 
one may consider the possibility of non-negligible resource costs (as against ' 'transfer payments") being involved here as relatively remote and hence 
unnecessary to analyze. In the case where these real costs are negligible, 
therefore, the following disparity results follow : 
(i) For LVDP price disparity, the results are naturally identical to 
those of Model I (2) : the price disparity does arise. The identity arises 
because, whereas in Model I (2) the domestic price pd reflects element α 
(the real cost to the importer of the sharing of the gain from faking with 
the exporter) in the present model it reflects instead element β (the finan- 
cial cost to the importer of the bribe paid to the customs officer). Elements 
β and α play, therefore, identical roles in regard to LVDP price disparity 
but, as noted below, are different in their welfare implications. 
(ii) Again, TLVDP price disparity will arise, as with Model I (2). For, 
{pt (l + t) - pd} = t (pc - ρ*) + β < 0 as β > 0 but cannot exceed in 
absolute magnitude the total gain from underinvoicing measured by 
Mp'c-Pc). 
(iii) PCC price disparity evidently exists, pf > pc, since the declared 
value in the importing country is faked at a lower value. 
(iv) Quantities are not faked, so qf = qc, i.e., PCC quantity disparity 
does not arise. 
(v) PCC value disparity will exist because pf qf > pc qc. 
(vi) LI price disparities will not exist under competitive import trade 
by uniform economic agents. 
As for conventional welfare implications, Model III implies a straight- 
forward cut in the effective tariff charged. Therefore, as with Model I (1) 
where also the real costs of faking are negligible, the effect is to increase 
welfare unambiguously. 
Model IV: Faked Invoicing of Quantity, with Bribes 
In this case, the customs officer clears an understated quantity of 
imports, charging the legal duty on a fraction of the actual imports. The 
rationale for this practice is obvious. The customs officer, to protect him- 
self, must show some legal imports of the item and faces a seriously en- 
hanced prospect of detection if no legal imports are registered at all. There 
is, therefore, some fraction of overall imports that will be declared for 
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legal-duty-rate assessment. However, the effective tariff rate will be re- 
duced since the actual imports will exceed the imports on which duty is 
assessed. Therefore, the practice embodied in Model IV amounts to simply 
cutting the actual, effective tariff rate. And it is done at negligible real 
cost since the bribing of the customs officer (constituting a transfer pay- 
ment, and hence a financial rather than real cost) makes it unnecessary to 
share the gains from faking with exporters or to incur extra costs of 
packaging to avoid detection etc1. The results are therefore fairly straight- 
forward. 
(i) Since the effective tariff is lowered, while the declared unit value 
or price is not faked, the domestic price will be lower than the landed 
price inclusive of the ineffective, legal tariff: pc (1 + 1) > pd.2 LVD Ρ price 
disparity will therefore obtain. 
(ii) Similarly, since pc = ρ*, Τ LVD Ρ price disparity also follows. 
(iii) PCC price disparity does not obtain, since it is quantities that are 
faked. 
(iv) The quantity faking implies that q£ > qc, so that PCC quantity 
disparity obtains. 
(v) PCC value disparity follows: pf qf > pcqc. 
(vi) LI price disparities do not obtain under competitive imports with 
uniform agents. 
The welfare implications are also straightforward. The absence of real 
costs in faking, combined with the fact that the model implies a cut in the 
effective tariff, mean that unambiguous welfare improvement results. 
J5. Illegal Trade through Illegal Entry Points 
The other, major class of illegal trade is what occurs through illegal 
entry points. This trade fits better the popular conception of illegality, of 
course. In this case it is conceivable, but highly improbable, that there 
1 As noted later, therefore, this model, while it is built on the notion of some legal trade 
permitting some illegal trade, à la Pitt [1981], departs radically from it in terms of its econom- 
ic implications. In fact, Model IV makes it somewhat meaningless to distinguish between 
legal and illegal trade since all trade is illegal here : some fraction of it is recorded and some 
not. Pitt's model, Model VI below, instead makes more sense when the legal trade is through 
legal channels and the illegal trade is through illegal channels, the trader handles both sources 
of imports, and the legal imports make it possible for the trader to escape detection on his 
handling of the illegal imports. 
8 The domestic price, pd , will reflect of course the bribe to the customs officer. It is only 
if the bribe fully absorbs the gain from faking that there will be equality of pc (1 + t) and pd, 
eliminating the LVDP price disparity. But that is only a limiting, and improbable, case. 
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are no significant real costs involved in the illegal trade. Typically, costs 
will result from damage in transit owing to the highly unorthodox methods 
of transportation involved and owing to the risks of detection1. Besides, 
unlike in the case of illegal trade through faking at legal entry points, 
the distinction between legal and illegal trade is now clearly meaningful. 
There are two major classes of models that exist now in the literature 
that seek to embody such illegal trade into general equilibrium analysis. 
These are discussed below, and their consequences for disparities and wel- 
fare spelled out. 
Model V : Smuggling of Untaxed Commodities by Firms Engaging in Illegal 
Trade 
In this model, the illegal and legal trade are assumed to be carried out 
by separate firms, with illegally imported commodities clearing in the 
market alongside with homogeneous, legally imported commodities at 
identical prices (whenever legal and illegal trades co-exist). This is the 
model in the early analysis of Bhagwati and Hansen [1973], and in the 
papers subsequently written by many authors such as Johnson [1974], 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan [1974], Falvey [1978], Ray [1978] and others. 
It also is the model underlying the analysis of Sheikh [1974]. In contrast 
however to Bhagwati and Hansen's assumption that the real costs of 
illegal trade (are higher than those of legal trade and) are incurred in the 
form of the traded commodities themselves (much like Samuelson's fa- 
mous "melting ice" assumption for dealing with transport costs), Sheikh 
assumes instead that these added costs are incurred in the form of an in- 
termediate good that uses primary factors directly. 
The contrast between the Bhagwati-Hansen and Sheikh methods of 
modelling the added real costs of illegal trade has implications for welfare 
under certain conditions; but these are of no immediate concern in the 
present context2. Hence, the precise analysis below will assume that the 
Bhagwati-Hansen model is relevant: so that the added costs of illegal 
trade can be portrayed as simply amounting to the importing country 
facing a less favourable foreign offer curve on illegal trade. 
Now, this model reduces in principle to Models I (2) and II (assuming 
that bribery is negligible in this type of illegal importation). However, 
aside from the fact that the price-disparity implications will be different 
1 Bhagwati and Hansen [1973] mention the gruesome xample of slaves being thrown 
overboard in the infamous lave trade after abolition when detection was imminent, so that 
more slaves were "lost" in illegal transit than if the trade were legal. 
2 Thus, if legal and illegal trade co-exist, the Bhagwati-Hansen model implies necessary 
welfare loss from illegal trade. Not so, under the Sheikh model. 
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in the present instance, an important difference is that the effective tariff 
on illegally imported goods now will be zero whereas in Models I (2) and II 
it will not be. Therefore, in depicting the economic analysis of Model V, 
Figure 1 must be modified to show the illegal trade as occurring at zero 
tariff rather than at just a reduced tariff. 
Thus, in Figure 2, which illustrates for simplicity the case of constant 
costs in illegal and legal transformation a d also a case where illegal trade 
dominates and drives out legal trade, the legal trade equilibrium in ab- 
sence of smuggling is portrayed with consumption, production and welfare 
Figure 2 
Good 2 A v 
0 Β Good 1 
at C|, P/, and Uj, respectively, and with illegal trade at Ct, P^ and 'Jit 
respectively. Here . Uj < Uj , though one could well have shown that 
Ui > Uf.1 The welfare implications of Model V, given the terms-of-trade 
deterioration implied by the added costs of illegal trade, are therefore 
not unambiguous. The disparity implications are as follows: 
(i) On legal (recorded) trade, where it exists, LVDP price disparity 
does not arise: p^ (1+ 1) = pd . 
(ii) Similarly, since pcZ = p**, TLVDP price disparity also does not 
exist. 
1 Cases where illegal and legal trade co-exist have been illustrated and discussed in 
Bhagwati and Hansen [1973]· 
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(iii) For PCC disparities, the answer depends on whether the illegal 
importation is recorded or not in the exporting country's statistics1. The 
PCC price disparity will, however, be non-existent regardless. 
(iv) PCC quantity disparity will arise, qf > qci , if the exporting coun- 
try records the illegal trade - which is perfectly possible since the illegal- 
ity is in importation; it will not arise, qf = qc/, if it does not. 
(v) PCC value disparity will arise or not, depending on whether PCC 
quantity disparity does. 
(vi) LI price disparity can now meaningfully exist as illegal and legal 
trades can always be differentiated. Since there is an added real cost to 
illegal trade, this will imply that p*z < p^ . 
Model VI : Smuggling of Untaxed Commodities by Firms Engaging Simul- 
taneously in Legal and Illegal Trade 
Pitt [1981] departs from the above model and essentially argues that 
the legal trade is undertaken so as to make illegal trade possible (at reduced 
risk)2. In this case, illegal trade cannot be undertaken by itself - as it, of 
course, is in practice in cases where there are outright prohibitions on 
legal importation. Once this link is established, legal trade can arise even 
at a loss as long as the loss is offset by the gain on the illegal trade that 
the legal trade makes possible3. 
Since the illegal trade occurs through illegal entry points in the present 
case, the present model assumes that the illegal trade occurs at an aug- 
mented real cost. The following implications then follow. 
1 For detecting unrecorded trade see also Nayak [1977]· 
8 Pitt [198 1 ] himself seems to imply that this model would work for illegal trade through 
legal entry points. Thus, he argues: "A large share of smuggling occurs not via 'ships in the 
night' but rather in broad daylight off the wharves of customs administered ports. Traded 
goods are misweighed, misgraded, misinvoiced or not invoiced at all with or without the 
cooperation of customs authorities. Some legal trade is necessary for this type of activity. 
The greater the legal trade [by a trading firm], the easier it is to hide smuggling activity from 
enforcement agencies and therefore the less costly will be smuggling. Thus, legal trade can be 
viewed as an input into the smuggling activity." However, illegal trade that occurs through 
legal entry points, such as customs administered wharves, involves surely some form of mis- 
invoicing that must imply one of the four Models I - IV distinguished above, depending on 
whether the customs officers are bribed or not and on whether the misinvoicing implies unit 
value or quantity faking. Pitt's argument that legal trade is required to support illegal 
trade, as developed by him, is surely more appropriate when the illegal trade is through 
illegal entry points, whether the offloading of the illegal trade is by day or by night! 
8 The loss on legal trade does not necessarily arise in all variants of this model. Une 
cannot rule out, in general, the possibility that both legal and illegal trade co-exist and yield 
"normal" profits. But this possibility is ignored in the text which follows Pitt's formulation 
in this regard. 
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(i) In this case, the model yields the LVD Ρ price disparity with the 
correct inequality à la Pitt, as it should since it was specifically devised to 
explain such a disparity: pci (1 + t) > pd . 
(ii) Since ρ*/ = pc/ , Τ LVD Ρ price disparity also follows in this model1. 
(iii) PCC price disparity will not arise : pf = pcZ . 
(iv) However, as in Model V, PCC quantity disparity will exist, i.e. 
°if > Qcz > or n°t exist depending on whether the illegal imports are re- 
corded in the exporting country's statistics or not. 
(v) This is equally true of PCC value disparity. 
(vi) Again, LI price disparity will exist since illegal trade will incur 
non-negligible real costs, so that pjj < p^ . 
As for welfare impact, this will again be ambiguous since the terms-of- 
trade loss on illegal trade will imply a loss to be set against the gain im- 
plied by the effective lowering of the importable good's domestic price, 
Pd·2 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In the foregoing analysis, several different forms of illegal trade are 
modelled, reflecting different ways in which illegal trade actually arises in 
the real world. The models are analyzed for their implications for conven- 
tionally-defined welfare impact as also for their implications regarding 
observable price, quantity or value data on trade so that the empirical 
analyst of illegal trade can detect the different types of illegal trade and 
possibly discriminate among them from the statistical evidence. The full 
set of results has been tabulated in the following table. 
1 Note of course that these LVDP and TLVDP price disparities were shown to arise in 
other models also in this paper. 
2 Pitt also considers the case where the real costs on illegal trade are negligible. In that 
case, the welfare impact owing to reduced domestic price of the imported good is unambigu- 
ously favourable, of course. 
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* * * 
Zusammenfassung: Alternative Theorien des illegalen Handels: Wirtschaft- 
liche Folgen und statistische Ermittlung. - In dem Artikel werden verschiedene 
Formen des illegalen Handels im Modell dargestellt und dabei verschiedene Wege, 
auf denen illegaler Handel in der Wirklichkeit entsteht, aufgezeigt. Untersucht wer- 
den die Modelle auf ihre Implikationen für die in konventioneller Weise definierte 
Wohlfahrt und außerdem im Hinblick auf die beobachtbaren Daten der Preise, 
Mengen und Werte im internationalen Handel, so daß der empirische Forscher die 
verschiedenen Arten des illegalen Handels ausmachen und möglicherweise zwischen 
ihnen aufgrund des statistischen Befunds diskriminieren kann. 
Résumé: Théories alternatives du commerce illégal: Les conséquences économi- 
ques et la détection statistique. - Dans l'article l'auteur modèle quelques formes du 
commerce illégal qui reflètent les aspects différents sous lesquels le commerce illégal 
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se manifeste dans le monde réel. L'analyse des modèles se concentre sur les impli- 
cations pour le bien-être conventionellement défini aussi bien que sur les implications 
regardant les données observables de prix, de quantité et de valeur afin que l'ana- 
lyste puisse découvrir les types différents du commerce illégal et possiblement diffé- 
rencier entre eux à l'aide de l'évidence statistique. 
* 
Resumem Teorias alternativas de comercio ilegal: Consecuencias económicas 
y detección estadística. - En el análisis siguiente, se modelan diferentes formas de 
comercio ilegal que refiejan diferentes caminos a traves de los cuales surge el comer- 
cio ilegal en el mundo real. Los modelos se analizan con respecto a sus implicaciones 
sobre el impacto de bienestar definido convencionalmente como también por sus 
implicaciones referentes al precio, cantidad y datos de valor observables del comercio, 
de tal manera que el analista empírico dei comercio ilegal pueda detectar los diferentes 
tipos de comercio ilegal y posiblemente discriminar entre llos a partir de Ia evidencia 
empírica. 
29* 
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